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EQUAL ACCESS TO POLE ATTACHMENT 
AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS OF TELEPHONE 
COMPANY PARTICIPATION IN THE CABLE 
TELEVISION MARKET 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of cable television ("CATV") in the 1950's, the 
CATV industry has spiraled in growth. The expansive development of 
this communication medium, however, did not occur without the inter-
vention of government regulation. One area identified by the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC") that required governmental 
oversight was access to utility poles and underground conduits for the 
attachment of cable distribution equipment. 1 
Historically, the CATV industry has utilized leasing arrangements 
to secure access for cable distribution systems rather than constructing 
its own poles or conduits. 2 In the majority of cases, CATV companies 
use leasing arrangements known as pole attachment agreements to ac-
quire access to utility poles. 3 These arrangements involve a rental of a 
portion of communication space4 on existing utility poles for the attach-
1. CATV systems consist of three components: (1) a receiving station which picks up 
signals transmitted by television and radio; (2) "headend" equipment which con-
verts the signals so that they can be retransmitted along coaxial cable; and (3) a 
coaxial cable distribution system which carries programming from the headend 
equipment to the homes of the subscribers. General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 
390, 393 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). The cable distribution sys-
tem, the third component, consists of three parts: (1) a trunk cable which runs from 
the headend equipment to the utility poles; (2) distribution cables which carry the 
signal from pole to pole; and (3) "drop lines" running from the utility poles to the 
subscribers' homes. /d. Although these cables are usually attached to utility poles, 
they may also be run underground. See Continental Cablevision v. American Elec. 
Power Co., 715 F.2d 1115, 1116 (6th Cir. 1983); Seigel, The History of Cable Televi-
sion Pole Attachment Regulation, 4 COMM. LAW. 9, 9 (1984). 
2. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
3. The term "pole attachment" refers to any attachment by a cable television system to 
a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a power utility or a 
telephone company. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (a)(4) (1982). The phrase "owners of utility 
poles" refers to poles owned or under the control of both power companies and 
telephone companies. It does not include any railroad, any cooperative organiza-
tion or any person owned by any state or federal government. /d. § 224(a)(1). 
4. Generally, utility poles have between 11 and 16 feet of "usable space" for power and 
communication equipment. See In re Adoption of Rules for the Regulation of 
Cable Television Pole Attachments, 77 F.C.C.2d 187, 191-93 (1980); S. REP. No. 
580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 20, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 109, 128. "Usable space" means the space above the minimum grade level 
which can be used for the attachment of wires, cables and associated equipment. 47 
U.S.C. § 224(d)(2) (1982). The usable space is rebuttably presumed to be 13.5 feet. 
See In re Adoption of the Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attach-
ments, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 69 (1979). Five feet of pole space is typically required for 
power equipment with the remaining space being divided between communication 
services. Although the actual cable used for the distribution of CATV program-
ming occupies only one inch of this space, CATV systems are deemed to occupy one 
foot of usable space. Monongahela Power Co. v. F. C. C., 655 F.2d 1254, 1256 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (one foot of space attributable to CATV is reasonable), aff'g In re Adop-
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ment of cable distribution equipment owned by CATV operators. In 
other cases, leasing arrangements known as channel service offerings 
have been employed to distribute cable programming. Under channel 
service arrangements, telephone companies own the equipment necessary 
for· cable distribution and furnish channel services to CATV operators. s 
CATV operators use this distribution service for a fee in lieu of pole at-
tachment agreements. 
Because of anticompetitive behavior by the owners of utility poles, 
CATV operators were often unable to secure either pole attachments or 
channel service offerings, or were unable to prevent owners from impos-
ing unreasonably high rents for pole attachments.6 To prevent anticom-
petitive behavior and encourage nation-wide distribution of CATV, 
Congress enacted, and the FCC promulgated, restrictions designed to 
eliminate predatory practices involving CATV access to utility poles and 
conduits. One restriction promulgated by the FCC, known as the cross-
ownership rules, prohibits telephone companies from owning, either di-
rectly or through affiliates, cable television systems within their telephone 
service areas. 7 A second restriction, the Communications Act Amend-
ments of 1978,8 ("Pole Attachment Act") empowers the FCC with the 
authority to ensure that the rates, terms and conditions of pole attach-
ment agreements are "just and reasonable."9 
The success these restrictions have had on the CATV industry is 
evidenced by CATV's evolution into a mature industry. 10 This market 
maturity, and consequent economic stability of the CATV industry, how-
tion of Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 77 F.C.C.2d 
187, 188-91 (1980); S. REP. No. 580, supra, at 20, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 128. See generally Seigel, supra note 1, at 10. 
5. See In re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 449 (1968), ajf'd sub nom. General 
Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). 
6. See infra notes 20-24, 115-127 and accompanying text. 
7. See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 
Stat. 2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. IV 1986)); 47 C.P.R. 
§§ 63.54-63.58 (1988); see also In re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C. 2d 448 (1968), 
ajf'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 888 (1969); 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982). See generally In re Applications of 
Telephone Common Carriers for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Fur-
nished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, re-
considered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), ajf'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. 
United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971); In reApplications of Telephone Com-
panies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated 
Community Antenna Television Systems, 34 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (1969) (notice of pro-
posed rule making). 
8. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 33, 35 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Pole Attachment 
Act]. 
9. 47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982). 
10. The FCC has estimated that approximately 80 percent of the nation's homes are 
now able to receive cable television. This figure is up almost 65 percent from the 
mid 1970's. Approximately 51 percent of the nation's television households actually 
subscribe to cable television service. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Televi-
sion Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5851-52, 
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ever, recently led the FCC to reconsider the continued viability of the 
cross-ownership rules. 11 As a result of this inquiry, the FCC has tenta-
tively concluded that a relaxation of the restrictions on telephone-cable 
company affiliation "would result in greater, not lesser, competition in 
cable television service and, therefore, in greater public interest benefits 
to consumers." 12 
This comment reviews the combination of factors that prompted the 
need for the Pole Attachment Act and examines the jurisdictional devel-
opment of pole attachment regulation. Next, the history of the cross-
ownership rules is explored. This section also examines the develop-
ments that have occurred since the rules' enactment and analyzes the 
impact that relaxing the cross-ownership rules would have on access to 
pole attachments under the current statutory framework. Finally, new 
rules are advocated that would ensure equal access to pole space for in-
dependent CATV systems. 
II. POLE ATTACHMENT REGULATION 
A. The Need for Government Regulation 
A significant number of pole attachment agreements had been nego-
tiated prior to enactment of the Pole Attachment Act. 13 Eventually, 
however, internal conflicts and external forces prompted the need for 
government intervention. For example, a gross inequality in bargaining 
power between the CATV industry and the utility industry resulted in 
disputes over the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachments. 14 Sim-
ilarly, a jurisdictional impasse between the FCC and the states left 
CATV companies without a forum for the review and resolution of pole 
attachment rate disputes. 
Two factors initially contributed to the inequity of bargaining posi-
tion between CATV companies and utility companies. First, the CATV 
industry depends on pole attachments as a means of cable broadcasting 
5853 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4658. 
11. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 
63.54-63.58, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 5092 (1987) (notice of inquiry). 
12. In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-
63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5849 (1988) (further notice of inquiry and notice of pro-
posed rule making). 
13. The FCC has estimated that over 7,800 CATV pole attachment agreements had 
been entered into prior to the enactment of the Pole Attachments Act. S. REP. No. 
580, supra note 4, at 12, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 120. 
14. As of July 1977, pole attachment disputes existed in 27 states. These disputes arose 
as the result of the escalating cost of pole attachment agreements. During the pe-
riod immediately preceding July 1977, pole attachment rates increased 55 percent 
with the average cost of a pole attachment rising from $3.90 to $6.05 per pole. See 
H.R. REP. No. 751, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1977). Service to many CATV 
subscribers was interrupted as a result of these disputes. See H.R. REP. No. 751, 
supra, at 3; 123 CONG. REC. 35,008 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (remarks of Cong. 
Broyhill). 
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distribution. 15 CATV industry reliance on these lease arrangements, as 
opposed to installation of its own poles, was not entirely voluntary. 
Rather, the CATV industry was virtually forced to use these arrange-
ments because of "practical, economic, and aesthetic reasons." 16 Practi-
cally, installation of CATV poles would have been a wasteful duplication 
of resources because space on existing utility poles was not being fully 
utilized. 17 Economically, the cost of leasing the space needed by CATV 
systems was much less than the cost of erecting separate utility poles. 18 
Finally, a duplication of utility poles and wires would create a "haphaz-
ard mesh on the skyline." 19 
The second factor leading to the disparate bargaining positions of 
the parties involved the telephone and power companies' domination of 
ownership and control of the poles necessary for attachment.20 
Although pole attachment agreements provided income to the utility 
from an otherwise surplus portion of plant, the utility companies recog-
nized that this source of income was not as vital to them as the pole 
attachment agreements were to the CATV companies.21 In addition, tel-
ephone companies were often reluctant, occasionally to the point of em-
ploying anticompetitive practices,22 to negotiate competitive pole 
15. See 123 CoNG. REc. 35,008 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (remarks of Cong. Broyhill). 
Prior to the enactment of the Pole Attachment Act, cable television companies 
owned or controlled less than one percent of the over 10 million poles to which 
CATV lines were attached. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 13, 1978 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 121. Power companies owned or controlled 53 percent 
of the utility poles involved in attachment agreements. Telephone companies con-
trolled the majority of the remaining poles. See id. 
16. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Tel. Ass'n, 310 Md. 
553, 556, 530 A.2d 734, 736 (1987). 
17. See supra note 4. 
18. See, e.g., Cable Information Serv., Inc. v. Appalachian Power Co., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 
387-89 ( 1980) (net cost of a bare pole was found to be approximately $114, whereas 
the maximum rental fee was found to be under $2); Teleprompter of Fairmont v. 
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 79 F.C.C.2d 232, 236-37 (1980) (net cost of a bare 
pole was found to be $90.30, whereas the maximum rental fee was found to be under 
$2). 
19. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 310 Md. at 560, 530 A.2d at 738; see also H.R. 
REP. No. 751, supra note 14, at 2; 123 CONG. REC. 35,008 (daily Ed. Oct. 25, 1977) 
(remarks of Cong. Broyhill). 
20. See supra note 15. 
21. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 
124. 
22. See, e.g., TV Signal Co. v. AT & T, 462 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1972) (telephone 
company refused to grant franchised CATV operator a pole attachment agreement 
but offered a restricted lease-back service); In re Dimension Cable TV, Inc., 25 
F.C.C.2d 520 (1970) (telephone company impermissibly constructed CATV channel 
facilities under the guise of a separate corporation without obtaining requisite 214 
certification); In re TeleCable Corp., 19 F.C.C.2d 574 (1969) (telephone company 
refused to negotiate pole attachments and increased the rental of existing agree-
ments from $3.00 to $4.50 in order to promote its channel distribution service); In 
re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448,462-63 (1969) (by reason of their control over 
utility poles, telephone companies were in a position to preclude or delay an unaffili-
ated CATV system from commencing service), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. 
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attachment leases because of a desire to develop and utilize their own 
cable access distribution systems.23 Accordingly, the utility companies 
were "unquestionably in a position to extract monopoly rents from the 
CATV systems in the form of unreasonably high pole attachment 
rents."24 
The combination of utility monopoly power and CATV dependence 
inevitably resulted in disputes between the parties over the availability 
and conditions of pole attachment agreements.25 Unable to resolve these 
disputes amoung themselves, the parties, particularly the CATV indus-
try, sought resolution of the disputes in the courts. 
At the federal level, the parties looked to the Federal Communica-
tions Commission for the resolution of pole attachment disputes. Begin-
ning in 1966 with In re California Water & Telephone Co.,26 the FCC 
began a ten year examination of the extent and nature of its jurisdiction 
over pole attachment agreements. Initially, the FCC asserted jurisdic-
tion over pole attachment agreements which involved only telephone 
companies. 27 Basing its decision on a broad interpretation of the Com-
munications Act of 1934,28 and on judicial interpretation of the Act,29 
the FCC reasoned that telephone company pole attachments were inci-
F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969); see also infra 
notes 11S-127 and accompanying text. 
23. Although telephone companies are prohibited, directly or through their affiliates, 
from furnishing CATV service in their telephone service area, they are permitted to 
provide channel service offerings to unaffiliated CATV operators. In a channel ser-
vice offering, the telephone company owns the distribution equipment and leases 
channels of communication to the CATV operator for a fee in lieu of pole attach-
ment agreements. However, before the telephone companies provide such a distri-
bution service, they must offer to make pole attachment access available to the 
CATV operator. See In reApplication of Telephone Companies for Section 214 
certificates for channel facilities furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Televi- · 
sion Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), aff'd sub nom., General Tel. Co. v. United 
States, 449 F.2d 846 (Sth Cir. 1971); 47 C.P.R. § 63.S7 (1988); see also infra note 
130 and accompanying text. See generally Paragon Cable Tel., Inc. v. F.C.C., 822 
F.2d 1S2, ISS (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
24. S. REP. No. S80, supra note 4, at 13, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 
121. 
2S. See, e.g., In re Continental Cablevision of N.H., Inc., 4S F.C.C.2d 10S8 (1974) (dis-
pute over "first-come, first-serve" policy regarding make-ready costs for pole attach-
ments); In re Better TV of Dutchess County, N.Y., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 939, 944 
(1971) (allegation that telephone company discriminated in denying CATV operator 
access to duct space). 
26. S F.C.C.2d 229 (1966). The pole attachment investigation arose out of the same 
proceedings which led to the development of the cross-ownership rules. See infra 
notes 102, 104 and accompanying text. 
27. In re California Water & Tel. Co., 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970). 
28. The statutory basis upon which the FCC relied was section 1S2(a) of title 47 of the 
United States Code which confers jurisdiction to the FCC over "all interstate and 
foreign communication by wire or radio." 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986); see also id. §§ 1 S 1, 1 S3(a)-(b) ( 1982). 
29. The judicial basis rested on the Supreme Court's interpretation of FCC authority to 
regulate cable television in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 1S7, 
167-68 ( 1968) (FCC has broad authority to regulate "all forms of electrical commu-
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dental to transmission by wire or radio, and were therefore within its 
jurisdiction. 30 
In 1977, however, the FCC reversed its initial decision, finding that 
it had no jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate 
pole attachment agreements between CATV companies and telephone 
companies.31 This change in jurisdictional policy evolved for two rea-
sons. First, the Commission reasoned that although it possessed broad 
powers to regulate all forms of communication, the fact that pole attach-
ment agreements were necessary to the CATV industry was not sufficient 
to bring the agreements within the FCC's authority. 32 Second, the Com-
mission concluded that since there was a division of ownership and con-
trol of the poles between power and telephone companies, 33 it would be 
irrational and ineffective to assert jurisdiction over telephone pole attach-
ments while not asserting jurisdiction over power company pole attach-
ments.34 Accordingly, disputes over pole attachment rates and 
conditions could not be resolved on a federal level. 
While the FCC was in the process of determining that it lacked the 
necessary authority to regulate pole attachment agreements, jurisdic-
tional issues were also being addressed at the state level. The state 
courts, however, proved to be an inadequate forum for the resolution of 
pole attachment disputes. Although employing a slightly different analy-
sis than the FCC, 35 a number of state courts also refused jurisdiction 
over such disputes. 36 Generally, these states concluded that pole attach-
ment agreements were neither a public utility service,37 nor sufficiently 
nications, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio.") (quoting S. REP. No. 
781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934)). 
30. California Water, 21 F.C.C.2d at 327. For a more detailed analysis of this decision, 
see Seigel, supra note 1, at 10-13. 
31. In re California Water & Tel. Co., 40 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 419 (1977). 
32. Id. at 425-26. 
33. See supra note 15. 
34. California Water, 40 Rad. Reg.2d at 426-27. 
35. Compare In re California Water & Tel. Co., 40 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 419 (1977) 
(denial of jurisdiction because pole attachments did not constitute wire or radio 
communications) with Ceracche Tel. Corp., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 49 Misc.2d 
554, 267 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (denial of jurisdiction because pole 
attachments did not constitute a public service). 
36. See, e.g., In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Pub. Util. Rep.3d (PUR) 117, 120 
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1966) (in absence of legislation specifically granting juris-
diction, public service commission had no jurisdiction over pole attachments); Con-
solidated Cable Serv., Inc. v. Leary, 382 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964) (court lacked power 
to compel public corporation to allow anyone to use its poles); Ceracche Tel. Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 49 Misc.2d 554, 267 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) 
(regulation of CATV is a question for the legislature, not the courts); WCOG, Inc., 
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Pub. Util. Rep.3d (PUR) 314, 318 (N.C. Util. 
Comm'n 1966) (because a pole attachment is a private use of surplus facilities, it is 
beyond the commission's authority). 
37. See International Cable TV Corp. v. All Metal Fabricators, Inc., 66 Pub. Util. 
Rep.3d (PUR) 446, 463 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966) (in the absence of a public 
offering, pole attachments do not constitute a public utility service). 
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related to public utility services,38 to come within the ambit of the state 
regulatory commissions' authority.39 
Thus, the CATV industry was faced with a two-fold problem. First, 
it lacked the bargaining power necessary to prevent unreasonable and 
arbitrary pole attachment practices by utility pole owners. Second, it 
lacked an available forum where these practices could come under re-
view. The solution to the CATV industry's problems rested on legisla-
tive intervention. The result was the adoption of the Pole Attachment 
Act of 1978.40 
B. The Dual Regulatory Policy of the Pole Attachment Act 
With the enactment of the Pole Attachment Act, Congress intro-
duced a comprehensive plan of regulation designed to redress the 
problems associated with pole attachment agreements. One of the cen-
tral purposes of this legislation was the establishment of a mechanism to 
assure the availability of a forum for the review and resolution of pole 
attachment disputes.41 The mechanism which resulted produced a dual 
system of federal and state regulation over pole attachment agreements. 
1. Federal Regulation 
Section 224(b) of the Pole Attachment Act empowers the FCC with 
the regulatory authority to hear disputes arising over the rates, terms and 
conditions of pole attachment agreements.42 Although not amounting to 
a classification of pole attachments as "wire or radio communications," 
the Pole Attachment Act expands the FCC's authority to include enti-
ties43 and practices44 not otherwise subject to FCC regulation.45 This 
expansion of jurisdictional authority enables the FCC to hear pole at-
tachment disputes regardless of who owns or controls the poles subject to 
attachment. 46 
The Pole Attachment Act also empowers the FCC with the author-
ity to ensure that the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachment 
agreements are "just and reasonable."47 Specifically, Congress mandated 
38. See Ceracche Tel., 49 Misc.2d at 557,267 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73 (rental of pole space 
by company to a CATV operator is not part of the public service performed by a 
company in the business of telephonic communications). 
39. For a more detailed analysis of each of the states rulings, see Seigel, supra note 1, at 
13-16. 
40. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 33, 35 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 
41. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 14, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 
122. 
42. 47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982). 
43. Principally, power utilities. See S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 15, 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 123. 
44. Principally, intrastate practices of power utilities. See id. 
45. /d. 
46. /d. 
47. 47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982). 
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a range of just and reasonable rates that: 
[A]ssures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional 
costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount 
determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable 
space ... which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum 
of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility 
attributable to the entire pole .... 48 
Pursuant to this authority, the FCC established the following formula to 
determine the maximum49 just and reasonable rate for pole attachments: 
Maximum Rate = [Space Occupied by CATV /Total Usable 
Space] X [Operating Expenses + Capital Cost of Poles )5° 
In practice, however, the FCC employs a slightly different formula. In-
stead of expressing operating expenses and capital costs of poles directly 
as dollar amounts, the FCC expresses these costs as a percentage of net 
pole investment. 5 1 Thus, the operating expenses and capital· costs of 
poles are normally determined from the net cost of a bare pole multiplied 
by the carrying charges attributable to the cost of owning a pole. The 
product of this calculation is then multiplied by the percentage of space 
used by the cable operator. The formula actually used by the FCC in 
computing the maximum rate for pole attachments is as follows: 
Maximum Rate = [Space Occupied by CATV /Total Usable 
Space] X [Net Cost of a Bare Pole] X [Carrying Charges).52 
48. /d. § 224(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also 124 CONG. REC. 1598 (daily ed. 
Jan. 31, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hollings); 123 CONG. REc. 35,007-08 (daily ed. Oct. 
25, 1977) (remarks of Cong. Wirth). This formula produces a zone of reasonable-
ness between incremental costs incurred by the utility as a result of the cable attach-
ments and fully allocated costs incurred by the utility in owning the poles regardless 
of the presence of cable. See S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 19, 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 127. The FCC, however, is not permitted to chose any 
figure which falls within the zone of reasonableness and set its rate there. Rather, 
the FCC must reach a "rational decision through rational means." See Texas 
Power & Light Co. v. F.C.C., 784 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir. 1986); Alabama Power 
Co. v. F.C.C., 773 F.2d 362, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
49. Virtually all of the complaints involving rate disputes are filed by the cable compa-
nies and allege that a utility is charging a rate in excess of the maximum level. As a 
result, the Commission focuses on the maximum rate allowable under the Pole At-
tachment Act. The pole attachment rate determined by the FCC formula, there-
fore, is rebuttably presumed to fall above the minimum statutory rate. See In re 
Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable Hardware to 
Utility Poles, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 4387, 4394 (1987); 47 C.P.R. § 1.1409(b) (1988). 
50. See In re Adoption of Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attach-
ments, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 70 (1979) (second report and order); In re Adoption of 
Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 68 F.C.C.2d 1585, 
1605 (1978) (first report and order); see also 47 C.P.R. § 1.1409(c) (1988). 
51. See 47 C.P.R. § 1.1404(g)(9) (1988). 
52. See Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C., 773 F.2d 363, 364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re 
Cable Information Serv., Inc., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 386 (1980). For purposes of this 
formula, space occupied by the CATV system is rebuttably presumed to be one foot 
and total usable space is rebuttably presumed to be 13.5 feet. See supra note 4. The 
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This FCC rate determination formula has recently come under judi-
cial scrutiny in Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C. 53 In Alabama Power, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined 
that the FCC rate formula methodology did not result in the calculation 
of the maximum just and reasonable rate allowable under the Pole At-
tachment Act. 54 In addition to finding that the FCC made several math-
ematical and conceptual errors, the court held that the Commission had 
improperly excluded the expenses incurred by the utility in providing 
guy wires and anchors in determining the figure for the net cost of 
poles, 55 and that the Commission's decision to deny the use of the nor-
malized tax method in calculating the carrying charges was arbitrary and 
capricious. 56 In response to this decision, the FCC modified its practices 
and formulas for computing maximum allowable rates for pole attach-
ment agreements. 57 
percentage used for computing carrying charges is determined from the sum of the 
percentage of pole investment devoted to each of five categories of expenses: admin-
istration, maintenance, taxes, depreciation, and cost of capital. See Alabama Power, 
773 F.2d at 369; Cable Information Serv., 81 F.C.C.2d at 389. The net cost of a bare 
pole is determined by subtracting the depreciation reserve related to poles, the accu-
mulated deferred taxes related to poles and the amount attributable to "non-cable-
related investment" from the gross investment in pole plant and dividing this figure 
by the number of poles involved in the attachment. See Alabama Power, 773 F.2d at 
365; Hardware Attachment Amendments, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. at 4388, 4402. Non-cable-
related investment is rebuttably presumed to be 5 percent of net pole investment for 
telephone companies and 15 percent of net pole investment for power utilities. /d. 
at 4389-90. Finally, net pole investment equals gross pole investment minus the 
depreciation reserve related to poles minus the accumulated deferred income taxes 
related to poles. /d. at 4402. 
53. 773 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
54. /d. at 367-72. 
55. /d. at 368-69. 
56. /d. at 370-71. The court arrived at this conclusion because of the Commission's 
inconsistent prior decisions concerning the use of the normalized method for tax 
computation. See Texas Power & Light Co. v. F.C.C., 784 F.2d 1265, 1270-72 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (non-normalized taxed component is inconsistent with the depreciation 
component in the Commission's formula and results in inconsistent and arbitrary 
rates). Compare Television Cable Serv., Inc. v. Monongahela Power Co., 88 
F.C.C.2d 56, 59 (1981) (denying the use of the normalized tax method) with Second 
Computer Inquiry, No. 81-893 (released May 15, 1985) (permitting the use of the 
normalized tax method). 
57. The FCC has made the following adjustments to the rate formula: (1) Non-pole-
related investment is rebuttably presumed to be 5 percent for telephone companies 
and 15 percent for power utilities; (2) a credit or offset for guys and anchors pro-
vided by a cable company will be allowed only where the cable operator demon-
strates that the guy or anchor benefits the utility or other pole users and the cable 
operator is obligated to provide such equipment under an agreement with the utility 
pole owner; (3) a ratio of total administrative and general expenses to total plant 
investment will be used to determine the percentage of investment devoted to pole 
attachment administrative and general carrying charges; (4) a separate charge or fee 
for items such as application processing or maintenance inspection will be offset 
against the annual rental fee or credited to the cable company if these costs are 
found to be already included in the utilities carrying charges; (5) a normalized tax 
calculation will be employed in determining the operating expenses and capital costs 
of the utility incurred as a result of owning and maintaining its poles; and (6) the 
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The constitutional validity of the Pole Attachment Act came under 
scrutiny in.F.C.C. v. Florida Power Co. 58 In Florida Power, the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether the FCC rate determination 
formula amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property without just 
compensation. 59 Reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, 60 the Supreme Court found that the rate-limiting regu-
lations of the Pole Attachment Act constituted neither a per se taking of 
the utilities property,61 nor a taking under traditional fifth amendment 
standards. 62 
In deciding the per se taking issue, the Court compared the provi-
sions of the Pole Attachment Act to the standards for a per se taking 
previously announced in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp. 63 Loretto involved a New York statute which was held to consti-
tute a per se taking because it required landlords to permit permanent 
occupation of their property by CATV companies. 64 The Florida Power 
Court, however, concluded that this per se rule was inapplicable to the 
Pole Attachment Act because the FCC did not require the power compa-
nies to provide pole attachment access to the CATV companies. 65 
The Florida Power Court next addressed the issue of whether the 
Pole Attachment Act effected a taking of property under traditional fifth 
amendment standards. Finding that the formula used by the FCC to 
determine the rate in question was not confiscatory,66 the Court held that 
the FCC order was a permissible regulation of rents rather than a 
taking. 67 
Thus, the Pole Attachment Act grants broad powers of regulation to 
presumption that the rate calculated under the FCC formula is just and reasonable 
may be rebutted by presenting evidence, on a case-by-case basis, which demon-
strates that the pole attachment contract contains particularly onerous provisions. 
See Hardware Attachment Amendments, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. at 4389-97; In re Amend-
ment of Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable Television Hard-
ware to Utility Poles, No. 88-421 (released Jan. 9, 1989). 
58. 480 u.s. 245 (1987). 
59. /d. at 248-50. 
60. Florida Power Co. v. F.C.C., 772 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 245 
(1987) (per curiam). 
61. Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 250-53. 
62. /d. at 253-54. 
63. 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
64. /d. at 425-41. 
65. Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 252; see also infra note 69. 
66. As long as the rates are not confiscatory, it is constitutionally permissible under the 
Fifth Amendment to limit the maximum rate chargeable from the use of private 
property for public concerns. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 
768-70 (1968). 
67. Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 253-54; cf Rural Tel. Coalition v. F.C.C., 838 F.2d 1307, 
1313 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (allocation of25% of local phone exchange costs to interstate 
jurisdiction did not constitute a confiscation of long-distance telephone carrier's 
property). For a detailed discussion of the Florida Power case, see Comment, The 
Constitutionality of Pole Attachment Legislation: Not a Taking, But a Valid Regula-
tion of Cable Television, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 321 (1987). 
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the FCC for resolving pole attachment disputes. The legislative history 
of the Pole Attachment Act, however, indicates several restrictions on 
the scope of this authority. First, jurisdiction can be established only 
where space on utility poles has been reserved for communication facili-
ties and is presently occupied by a communication system.68 Second, the 
FCC does not have the authority to guarantee access to pole attachments 
for CATV systems, nor can it require a power utility to dedicate a por-
tion of its poles for communication space.69 Finally, the FCC arguably 
does not have the authority to involve itself directly in the agreements 
entered into between the parties. Rather, FCC involvement will occur 
only in terms of resolving disputes which the parties bring before it. 70 
2. State Preemption of FCC Jurisdiction 
In addition to the jurisdictional limitations previously discussed, 
FCC authority can be preempted by individual state regulation. Con-
gress has "recognized the 'inherent power of a State' to regulate pole 
attachment contracts and intended to provide a forum for litigation con-
cerning such contracts only in cases where no state forum was 
available."71 
Section 224( c) of the Pole Attachment Act provides the mechanism 
whereby states may obtain jurisdiction over the regulation of pole attach-
ment agreements.72 To preempt federal jurisdiction, each state must cer-
tify to the FCC that: 
68. See In re Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable 
Hardware to Utility Poles, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 4387, 4397-98, 4404 (1987); S. REP. No. 
580, supra note 4, at 15, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 123; 124 
CONG. REc. 1598 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hollings); 47 C.F.R. 
§ 1.1404(d)(l)-(2) (1988); see also Cable Information Serv., Inc. v. Appalachian 
Power Co., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 391 (1980). 
69. See Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 251 n.6 ("The language of the Act provides no ex-
plicit authority to the FCC to require pole access for cable operators, and the legis-
lative history strongly suggest that Congress intended no such authorization."); In 
re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 3d (PUR) 117 (Fla. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n 1966); S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 15-16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 123-24; see also Paragon Cable Tel., Inc. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 152, 
154 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court recognized, but did not decide, whether the FCC 
had authority to compel a utility to make pole attachment agreements); cf Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (act which author-
ized a permanent physical occupation of property without just compensation was 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment). 
70. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 15, 22, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
at 123, 130. But see 47 C.F.R. § 1.1403(a) (1988) (a utility is required to provide a 
CATV system operator with no less than 60 days notice prior to (1) removal of 
facilities or termination of any service to those facilities if the cause or the termina-
tion arises out of a rate, term or condition of a pole attachment, or (2) any increase 
in pole attachment rates). · 
71. Utah Cable Tel. Operators Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 
1982). 
72. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(l)-(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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(1) it regulates the terms, rates and conditions for pole attach-
ments; and 
(2) in so regulating, it has the authority to consider and does 
consider the interests of both the subscribers and the con-
sumers of utility service. 73 
Further, the state must implement its regulatory authority by issuing ef-
fective rules and regulations, 74 and it must take final action on all com-
plaints within a prescribed period of time. 75 
This certification procedure is designed to ensure that a forum is 
available for dispute resolution and that the state is willing and able to 
provide this forum. Thus, even if a state has the required authority, FCC 
certification will be denied if the state is not regulating or prepared to 
regulate upon request.76 The FCC, however, does not have the authority 
to review the viability of the regulatory framework developed by the 
state, nor can it question a state's underlying base of authority. 77 Rather, 
these issues are left to judicial resolution within each particular state. 
C. The Battle for State Regulation 
The FCC may consider a petition for certification as conclusive of a 
state's preemptive authority to regulate, but the state which has received 
certification may still deny jurisdiction. 78 The individual state's responsi-
73. /d. at§ 224(c)(2)(A)-(B); see also 124 CoNG. REc. 1598-99 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1978) 
(remarks of Sen. Hollings). 
74. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); see also The Cable Communications Pol-
icy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 4, 98 Stat. 2779, 2801. The FCC requires 
that when a state requests certification, it must certify that its rates and regulations 
include a specific methodology, which has been made publicly available in the state, 
for regulating pole attachments. 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,656-57 (May 2, 1985). 
However, the Commission has found that it does not possess the authority to define 
the specific methodology to be followed by the states, nor the responsibility to deter-
mine whether the state's specific methodology comports with the requirements of 
section 224(c). ld. at 18,657. 
75. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(3)(B)(i),(ii) (Supp. IV 1986); see also The Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 4, 98 Stat. 2779, 2801-02. A state public 
service commission must take final action on a pole attachment complaint within 
180 days after the complaint is filed, or within the applicable period prescribed for 
such final action, if the prescribed period does not extend beyond 360 days after the 
filing of such complaint. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (c)(3)(B)(i),(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). 
76. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 17, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 
125. 
77. ld. The FCC may question a state certification request only where there is evidence 
that a party is unable to file a complaint with the state public service commission, or 
where the state public service commission fails to issue a determination on a com-
plaint within 180 days of filing or within the period prescribed for final action in the 
state. In reCertification by the Louisiana Public Service Commission Concerning 
Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 1 F.C.C.Rcd. 522 (1986); 50 Fed. 
Reg. 18,637, 18,657 (May 2, 1985). 
78. Five state courts have found that their public service commissions do not have au-
thority to assert jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements. American Cable 
Tel., Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 143 Ariz. 273, 693 P.2d 928 (1983); Tele-
prompter Corp. v. Hawkins, 384 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1980); Illinois-Indiana Cable Tel. 
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bility is to determine whether or not it possesses sufficient authority to 
satisfy the certification requirements of the FCC. 79 This requires the 
state to examine its own regulatory body's statutory basis for asserting 
jurisdiction and for considering the needs of CATV subscribers and util-
ity customers. 80 These examinations have produced mixed results; a 
number of states have allowed their public service commissions to regu-
late pole attachments,81 while others have denied their commission's au-
thority and returned the regulatory responsibility to the FCC. 82 
The rationale of the courts which permit their public service com-
missions to regulate pole attachments, in the absence of specific legisla-
tive authority,83 is best espoused in Louisiana Cablevision v. Louisiana 
Public Service Commission. 84 In Louisiana Cablevision, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court found that because of the potential for pole attachments 
to disrupt the safe and continued delivery of electric and telephonic serv:-
ices to its citizens, Louisiana's public service commission's authority 
"must necessarily extend to ... oversight of the growing use of utility 
poles for cable [attachment]."85 Further, the court reasoned that the rev-
enues generated by pole attachments directly affect a utility's calculation 
of rates, thereby bringing pole attachments within the public service 
commission's duty to ensure fair utility rates. 86 
Having concluded that the public service commission possessed the 
power to regulate the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachment 
agreements, the court analyzed whether the public service commission 
had authority to consider the interests of CATV subscribers. 87 The court 
Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 427 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. App. 1981); Chesapeake & 
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Tel. Ass'n, 310 Md. 553, 530 A.2d 
734 (1987); In re New England Cable Tel. Ass'n, 126 N.H. 149, 489 A.2d 124 
(1985). 
79. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. 
80. Because pole attachment agreements involve utilities, the typical regulatory body is 
a public service commission or a public utilities commission. For purposes of this 
comment, public service commission will encompass both terms. 
81. Seven state courts have found that their public service commissions have sufficient 
authority to assert jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements. Cable Tel. Co. v. 
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 82 Ill. App.3d 814, 403 N.E.2d 287 (1980); Kentucky 
CATV Ass'n v. Volz, 675 S.W.2d 393 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Louisiana Cablevision v. 
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 493 So.2d 555 (La. 1986); Consumers Power Co. v. 
Telesystems, Inc., 96 Mich. App. 1, 292 N.W.2d 472 (1980); Las Cruces TV Cable 
v. New Mexico Corporate Comm'n, 102 N.M. 720, 699 P.2d 1072 (1985); General 
Tel. Co., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 63 A.D.2d 93, 406 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1978); Utah 
Cable Tel. Operators Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398 (Utah 1982). 
82. See supra note 78. 
83. See, e.g., Utah Cable Tel. Operators Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398 
(Utah 1982) (legislation specifically granting authority to their public service com-
mission for the regulation of pole attachment agreements). 
84. 493 So.2d 555 (La. 1986). 
85. Id. at 558; see also Kentucky CATV, 675 S.W.2d at 396-97; General Tel., 63 A.D.2d 
at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 912. 
86. Louisiana Cablevision, 493 So.2d at 558; see also Kentucky CATV, 675 S.W.2d at 
396; General Tel., 63 A.D.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12. 
87. Louisiana Cablevision, 493 So.2d at 558. 
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found that the authority to regulate pole attachments existed within the 
commission's responsibility to ensure just and reasonable rates for utili-
ties. This responsibility required the public service commission to bal-
ance the interests of the CATV subscribers with those of the utility 
customers. 88 With both provisions of the FCC certification requirements 
satisfied, the court concluded that the public service commission had suc-
cessfully preempted federal jurisdiction for pole attachment regulation. 89 
Although a common rationale developed among those states which 
have asserted jurisdiction over pole attachment disputes, the disparity in 
the underlying grant of power to each state's public service commission 
has contributed to a greater divergence in rationale among those states 
which have denied jurisdiction. Nonetheless, several dominant themes 
have been followed by state courts which have concluded that their regu-
latory bodies lacked authority to regulate pole attachments. These 
themes are best exemplified in Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Ass'n v. 
Public Service Commission.90 Echoing the rationale employed by state 
courts in pre-Pole Attachment Act cases,91 the court found that the at-
tachment of cable to utility poles was not sufficiently related to the busi-
ness of producing electric and telephonic services to be considered a 
public utility service and, therefore, was outside the realm of their public 
service commission's jurisdiction.92 The court added that although the 
public service commission had authority to regulate pole attachments in 
order to "ensure the safe operations of a utility and to ensure uninter-
rupted service," the current practice of attaching cable to utility poles 
presented no such dangers.93 As further support for its position, the 
court explained that the decision to regulate pole attachments was a leg-
88. /d. at 558-59; see also Kentucky CATV, 675 S.W.2d at 397. 
89. Louisiana Cablevision, 493 So.2d at 559. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not 
address the issue of whether the Louisiana public service commission had made 
effective rules and regulations implementing its regulatory authority over pole at-
tachments. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. The FCC, however, in 
In reCertification by the Louisiana Public Service Commission Concerning Regula-
tion of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 1 F.C.C.Rcd. 522 (1986), found that 
there was no allegation of an inability to file a complaint with the Louisiana public 
service commission nor was there any evidence that a complaint had been pending 
with the commission longer than the 180-day period. /d. The FCC concluded, 
therefore, that the request was proper and pole attachment jurisdiction would vest 
with the Louisiana public service commission. Id. 
90. 427 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. App. 1981). 
91. See supra text and accompanying notes 35-39. 
92. Illinois-Indiana Cable, 427 N.E.2d at 1109-11; see also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. 
Co. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Tel. Ass'n, 310 Md. 553, 561-64, 530 A.2d 734, 
738-39 (1987) ("[T]he use of utility poles for the suspension of cable television lines 
is not an essential service provided to the entire public, but is instead an incidental 
service provided to only a few private parties. Consequently, it is not a 'public util-
ity service.'"); American Cable Tel., Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 143 Ariz. 
App. 273, 278, 693 P.2d 928, 933 (1983) ("[W]e do not find that pole attachment 
licenses granted by [a utility company] are public utility services."). 
93. Illinois-Indiana Cable, 427 N.E.2d at 1107. 
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islative, rather than a judicial determination.94 As a final basis for deny-
ing jurisdiction, the court noted the availability of a federal forum for the 
resolution of the disputes between the parties.95 Consequently, the peti-
tioners were required to litigate their pole attachment claim at the federal 
level.96 
Thus, the Pole Attachment Act has succeeded in assuring that at 
least one forum will be available for the resolution of pole attachment 
disputes. Similarly, the Act's rate determination formula has amelio-
rated some of the anticompetitive potential surrounding pole attachment 
agreements. The Pole Attachment Act, however, has not proven suc-
cessful in assuring pole access to CATV operators in all cases. Instead, 
the CATV industry has had to rely upon rules which prohibit telephone 
company participation in the CATV business to minimize the pole access 
problem. 
III. TELEPHONE COMPANY-CABLE TELEVISION CROSS-
OWNERSHIP RULES 
A. Regulation of Channel Service Offerings 
For more than twenty years, the FCC has found it necessary to reg-
ulate telephone company involvement in the cable television industry. 
The cross-ownership rules,97 which presently prohibit telephone compa-
nies from providing cable television within their service areas, however, 
were not the genesis of this regulatory intervention. Rather, the cross-
ownership rules evolved from the FCC's regulation of cable distribution 
services furnished by the telephone companies to CATV operators. 
· The FCC began its regulation of cable distribution service in April 
1966 when it directed several telephone companies to file tariffs for chan-
nel service offerings made to CATV operators. 98 Channel service offer-
94. Id. at 1112; see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Hawkins, 384 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1980) 
(" '(C)ommunity antenna television systems have never been defined as 'public utili-
ties' by the legislature, nor is there anything ... which would justify the conclusion 
that such systems are vested with a public interest; in actual fact, they may be of 
such character as to justify public regulation and control. That, however, is a mat-
ter for determination by the state legislature.'") (quoting In re Southern Bell Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 65 Pub. Util. Rep.3d (PUR) 117, 119-20 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1966)). 
95. Illinois-Indiana Cable, 427 N.E.2d at 1112. The court's reliance on the availability 
of a federal forum as a basis for denying jurisdiction is misplaced. The legislative 
history of the Pole Attachment Act reveals that Congress intended that state gov-
ernments should have the sole responsibility for regulatory oversight of pole attach-
ment agreements. SeeS. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS at 124. Further, the legislative history indicates that federal in-
volvement in pole attachment regulation was justified only because uniform state 
regulation did not exist. /d. at 17, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 125. 
96. When a state which has received FCC certification subsequently denies that it has 
authority to regulate pole attachments, regulatory responsibility reverts to the FCC. 
See Consumers Power Co. v. Telesystems, Inc., 96 Mich. App. 1, 292 N.W.2d 472, 
474 (1980). 
97. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-63.58 (1988); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
98. The tariffs required telephone companies to provide information relating to the type 
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ings are leasing arrangements wherein telephone companies provide the 
distribution equipment necessary for cable distribution and furnish chan-
nels of communication to CATV operators.99 Although the telephone 
carriers responded to the tariffs, they challenged the jurisdictional basis 
upon which the FCC required such filings. 100 The FCC, however, af-
firmed its jurisdictional authority to require the tariffs. It reasoned that 
the offering of channels of communication to CATV operators consti-
tuted interstate communication and, therefore, came within its jurisdic-
tion as a "common carrier" service. 101 
Shortly after finding that it possessed sufficient authority to require 
the tariffs, the FCC instituted investigations into the lawfulness of the 
tariffs filed by several telephone companies. 102 The scope of inquiry in-
cluded investigation into whether section 214 of the Communications 
Act of 1934, which requires that telephone companies obtain a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity from the FCC prior to constructing 
or extending any communication lines, applied to telephone companies 
that provided channel service offerings. 103 This issue was resolved by the 
of service offered and the charges imposed for such service. The service offered was 
the non-exclusive transmission of television and FM radio programming from the 
CATV's headend equipment to the subscriber's homes. Charges for the service 
were based on the length of cable carrying the transmission and on the number of 
cable drops to subscriber's homes. In re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 450 
(1968), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). 
99. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
100. See In re Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C.2d 257 (1966). 
101. /d. at 259-60;seea/so47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (FCC jurisdiction 
extends "to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio .... "); /d. 
§ 153(h) ( 1982) ("common carrier" means any person engaged for hire in interstate 
or foreign communication by wire or radio); /d. § 202(b) (1982) (FCC has authority 
over "services in connection with, the use of common carrier lines of communica-
tion, whether derived from wire or radio facilities ... or incidental to radio commu-
nication of any kind."). 
102. See In re The General Tel. System, 6 F.C.C.2d 434 (1967); In re The Associated 
Bell System Companies, 5 F.C.C.2d 357 (1966); In re California Water & Tel. Co., 5 
F.C.C.2d 229 (1966). The investigations were subsequently consolidated for hear-
ing. See In re California Water & Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 440 (1967); In re California 
Water & Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 441 (1967). 
103. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, title I,§ 214,48 Stat. 1064, 1075-76 (codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982)). Section 214 provides: 
(a) Exceptions; temporary or emergency service or discontinuance of ser-
vice; changes in plant, operation or equipment 
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of a ex-
tension of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension 
thereof, or shall engage in transmission over or by means of such addi-
tional or extended line, unless and until there shall first have been obtained 
from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public con-
venience and necessity require or will require the construction, or opera-
tion, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line: 
Provided, That no such certificate shall be required under this section for 
the construction, acquisition, or operation of (1) a line within a single State 
unless such line constitutes part of an interstate line, (2) local, branch, or 
terminal lines not exceeding ten miles in length, or (3) any line acquired 
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Commission in In re General Telephone Co. 104 
In General Telephone, the Commission first addressed the issue of 
whether it possessed jurisdiction over channel service offerings when the 
reception and transmission facilities utilized in the offerings were located 
entirely within one state. 105 Noting that CATV was considered inter-
state communication because it facilitated the interstate transportation of 
television signals, 106 the Commission observed that this was true even 
where the broadcast signals " 'emanate from stations located within the 
same state in which the CATV system operates.' " 107 Accordingly, the 
Commission found that because channel service offerings were links in 
the transmission of broadcast signals from the point of origin to the sub-
scriber's home, telephone companies who provide these offerings, irre-
spective of the location of their facilities, were performing an interstate 
communication service. 108 
With its jurisdictional authority established, the Commission next 
considered whether there were any exceptions that would exempt tele-
phone companies from the requirements of a section 214 certificate of 
public convenience and necessity. 109 The telephone companies claimed 
that because the lines employed in channel service offerings did not cross 
under section 221 or 222 of this title: Provided further, That the Commis-
sion may, upon appropriate request being made, authorize temporary or 
emergency service, or the supplementing of existing facilities, without re-
gard to the provisions of this section. No carrier shall discontinue, reduce, 
or impair service to a community, or part of a community, unless and until 
there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that 
neither the present nor future public convenience and necessity will be 
adversely affected thereby; except that the Commission may, upon appro-
priate request being made, authorize temporary or emergency discontinu-
ance, reduction, or impairment of service, or partial discontinuance, 
reduction, or impairment of service, without regard to the provisions of 
this section. As used in this section the term "line" means any channel of 
communication established by the use of appropriate equipment, other 
than a channel of communication established by the interconnection of 
two or more existing channels: Provided, however, That nothing in this 
section shall be construed to require a certificate or other authorization 
from the Commission for any installation, replacement, or other changes 
in plant, operation, or equipment, other than new construction, which will 
not impair the adequacy or quality of service provided. 
47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1982). 
104. 13 F.C.C.2d 448 (1968), aff'd sub nom., General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). Because of administrative procedure, 
the section 214 issue was deleted from the consolidated proceeding and a separate 
proceeding was initiated to resolve this issue. See In re California Water & Tel. Co., 
7 F.C.C.2d 571 (1967); In re California Water & Tel. Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 575 (1967). 
105. General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 460-61. 
106. Id. at 454-55; see also Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. F.C.C., 387 F.2d 220, 225 (1967) 
(CATV systems facilities are a "link in the interstate transportation of television 
signals.") 
107. General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 454-55 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable 
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968)). 
108. Id. at 455. 
109. Id. at 456-461. 
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state boundaries, section 214(a)(1)'s exclusion of "a line within a single 
state unless such line constitutes a part of an interstate line" exempted 
them from the requirements of section 214. 110 The Commission rejected 
this argument based on section 214's definition of a line as "any channel 
of communication established by the use of appropriate equipment." 111 
The telephone companies further argued that even if section 214(a)(1) 
did not exempt them from section 214, they were exempt under section 
214(a)(2). Section 214(a)(2) excludes "local, branch, or terminal lines 
not exceeding ten miles in length" from the requirements of section 
214. 112 The Commission found that section 214(a)(2) was not applicable 
because channel service offerings were a new service rather than a modifi-
cation of existing services. 113 Consequently, the Commission concluded 
that a section 214 certification was necessary before the telephone com-
panies could provide channel service offerings to independent CATV 
systems. 
Subsequent requests for section 214 certification quickly revealed to 
the Commission the extensive affiliation that existed between CATV op-
erators and telephone companies. 114 The Commission expressed concern 
over such common ownership in General Telephone, where it stated: 
By reason of its control over utility poles, or other local advan-
tages resulting from its status as an existing common carrier in 
the community, the telephone company is in a position to pre-
clude or to substantially delay an unaffiliated CATV system 
from commencing service and thereby eliminate competition. 
Furthermore, construction by a telephone company for an affil-
iated CATV operator calls for careful scrutiny on the part of 
the commission in order to insure against wasteful duplication 
or unnecessary construction. 115 
As a result, the Commission initiated inquiry and proposed rule-making 
into whether telephone companies, either directly or through affiliates, 
should be permitted to provide cable television service. 116 
110. /d. at 457; see also supra note 103. 
Ill. General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 457-58. 
112. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)(2) (1982); see also supra note 103. 
113. General Tel., 13 F.C.C. at 459. 
114. Common ownership between telephone companies and CATV systems became ap-
parent from the first petitions that were filed for section 214 certification. In each 
petition, some degree of ownership affiliation was found to exist. See Applications 
of Telephone Companies for Certain Certificates for Channel Facilities, 34 Fed. 
Reg. 6,290, 6,291 (1969). 
115. General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 463. 
116. See In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regu-
lations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems and Inquiry Into the 
Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regula-
tory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 15 F.C.C.2d 417,441-42 
(1968); Applications of Telephone Companies for Certain Certificates for Channel 
Facilities, 34 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (1969). 
1988] Equal Access to Pole Attachment Agreements 183 
B. Development of the Cross-Ownership Rules 
In In reApplications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certifi-
cates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna 
Television Systems, 117 the FCC considered a variety of issues regarding 
the necessity of prohibiting telephone company-CATV cross-ownership. 
The CATV companies claimed that a prohibition against cross-owner-
ship was needed because telephone companies were engaged in various 
anticompetitive practices which threatened the viability of independent 
CATV service. 118 For example, CATV operators asserted that telephone 
companies were subsidizing their affiliated CATV operations in an effort 
to undercut the prices offered by independent systems. 119 They also al-
leged that telephone companies were arbitrarily ~efusing to grant pole 
space to independent CATV systems in order to eliminate competition 
with their own affiliated systems.12o 
In response, the telephone companies denied any discriminatory 
treatment towards unaffiliated CATV operators and objected to being 
singled out from other owners of CATV systems for special conditions 
and restrictions. 121 In addition, the telephone companies contended that 
their utility poles were private property and, therefore, they were under 
no obligation to make pole space available for unaffiliated systems. 122 
Upon reviewing the arguments of the parties, the FCC found that 
there was an "anomalous competitive situation" between CATV systems 
owned by, or affiliated with telephone companies, and independent cable 
television systems which relied upon the telephone companies for chan-
nel service offerings or access to pole attachments. 123 This anomalous 
situation developed from the telephone companies' natural monopoly 
over the utility pole lines required for CATV distribution. 124 The Com-
mission reasoned that because of this market power, the potential for 
telephone companies to favor affiliated CATV systems over independent 
operators necessitated governmental intervention. 125 As a further indica-
tion of need for regulation, the Commission noted that telephone com-
pany ownership of CATV services "not only tends to exclude others 
from entry into that service, but also tends to extend, without need or 
justification, the telephone company's monopoly position to broadband 
117. 21 F.C.C.2d 307, reconsidered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Gen-
eral Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). 
118. /d. at 311-13. 
119. /d. at 311. 
120. /d. The CATV companies cited other alleged anticompetitive practices, such as 
manipulating community leaders to secure CATV franchises, exerting pressure 
upon independent CATV operators to force them to accept more expensive distribu-
tion systems, and charging rates for pole attachments which were unrelated to the 
cost of providing such services. /d. at 311-12. 
121. /d. at 310. 
122. /d. at 311. 
123. /d. at 323. 
124. /d. at 324. 
125. /d. 
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cable facilities and the new and different services such facilities are ex-
pected to be providing in the future." 126 Accordingly, the Commission 
concluded that the public interest would best be served by prohibiting 
telephone companies from engaging in the sale of CATV service within 
their telephone service areas. 127 
To implement its findings, the Commission amended part 63 of its 
rules to include the telephone company-cable television cross-ownership 
rules. 128 The rules prevent telephone companies from providing channel 
service offerings or pole attachment agreements to controlled or affiliated 
CATV systems within their telephone service areas. 129 The cross-owner-
ship rules also require telephone companies to offer CATV systems the 
alternative of pole attachment rights before providing a channel distribu-
tion service. 130 
The FCC's decision to adopt the cross-ownership rules was appealed 
to federal court. In General Telephone Co. v. United States, 131 the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the FCC had statu-
tory authority to adopt the cross-ownership rules, and whether the rules 
deprived the telephone companies of any rights in violation of the Consti-
tution. Addressing the statutory authority issue, the court noted that the 
FCC had a responsibility to " 'make available, so far as possible, to all 
the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide and world-
wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at 
reasonable charges ... .' " 132 The court reasoned that development of 
CATV service on a national level fell within this responsibility and, 
therefore, the FCC had the authority to foster CATV growth by limiting 
126. /d. The Commission noted that broadband cable could provide a broader range of 
service than could be provided on traditional telephonic service, such as data stor-
age, distribution and retrieval, and facsimile transmissions. /d. at 324-25; see also 
General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 851 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971). 
127. Applications for Section 241 Certificates, 21 F.C.C.2d at 325-26. 
128. 47 C.P.R. § 63.54-63.58 (1988). 
129. /d. § 63.54(b). The rules provide that the terms "affiliates" and "control" bar any 
financial or business relationship between a telephone company and a CATV sys-
tem. /d. § 63.54 n.1(a). For example, the following relationships are within the 
definitions of control and affiliate: (1) A debtor-creditor relationship except with 
respect to communication services; (2) interlocking officers, directors or other em-
ployees at the management level; and (3) common ownership by one company in the 
other. /d. § 63.54 n.1(b); see also id. § 63.54 n.2 (provisions for determining com-
mon ownership in corporations with more than 50 stockholders). Telephone com-
panies must demonstrate the lack of control over, or affiliation with, the CATV 
systems as a prerequisite to receiving a section 214 certificate for constructing or 
operating a channel distribution service. /d. § 63.55. 
130. /d. § 63.57. The offer of a pole attachment right must exist both at the time of 
section 214 certification as well as at the time when the CATV operator seeks a local 
franchise. /d. The offer must be reasonable with respect to the charges for the pole 
attachment and must not unduly restrict the uses that may be made of the channel 
by the CATV operator. /d.; see also supra note 23. 
131. 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). 
132. /d. at 854 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)). 
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the involvement of telephone companies in CATV service. 133 
With respect to the constitutional issues, the telephone companies 
claimed that the CATV service prohibition in the rules was not reason-
ably related to the goal of ensuring national distribution of cable televi-
sion.134 The court concluded that the cross-ownership rules were neither 
arbitrary nor unreasonable because telephone companies had monopoly 
power over CATV distribution systems. 135 Moreover, the court noted 
that telephone companies were not completely prevented from entering 
the CATV market; rather, they were only prohibited from providing 
CATV service within their own telephone service areas. 136 
The telephone companies also argued that requiring an offer of pole 
space as a prerequisite for receiving permission to construct channel ser-
vice facilities 137 deprived them of their property without due process of 
law. 138 In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that there was no 
deprivation of property because telephone companies only were required 
to offer pole space when they voluntarily engaged in offering channel ser-
vice facilities. 139 The requirement of offering pole space was simply a 
reasonable condition to entry into the CATV market rather than an un-
constitutional taking.t40 
C. Exceptions to the Cross-Ownership Rules 
In its effort to ensure that CATV would be available to as wide a 
viewing public as possible, the FCC included several exceptions to the 
cross-ownership restrictions. Foremost among these exceptions is sec-
tion 64.56(a). 141 This section provides that where it can be demonstrated 
that CATV service could not exist except through common ownership, 
or upon a general showing of good cause, the cross-ownership rules will 
133. /d. at 854-55. The telephone industry also argued that the FCC's reliance on anti-
trust principles in formulating the cross-ownership rules was beyond its authority. 
The court rejected this argument by finding that the "public convenience and neces-
sity" standard of section 214 was sufficiently broad to permit the Commission to 
consider the anticompetitive potential of television company-CATV cross-owner-
ship. /d. at 856-58; see also United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351-
52 (1959) (antitrust considerations alone may be sufficient for the FCC to find that 
statutory standards could not be met). 
134. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 859. The court categorized the issue as "whether the rules 
comport with the requirements of substantive due process." /d. 
135. /d. 
136. /d. at 859-60; see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54, 64.601 (1988); In re Blanket Section 214 
Authorization for Provision by a Telephone Carrier of Lines for its Cable Television 
and Other Non-Common Carrier Services Outside its Telephone Service Area, 49 
Fed. Reg. 21,333 (1984) (blanket section 214 permission to provide channel service 
offerings outside of television service area). 
137. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.57 (1988). 
138. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 860-61. 
139. /d. at 860. A similar analysis was employed by the Supreme Court in F.C.C. v. 
Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245 (1987), to determine the constitutional validity of 
the pole attachment rules. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. 
140. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 860. 
141. 47 C.F.R. § 64.56(a) (1988). 
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be waived if such waiver is found by the Commission to be in the public 
interest. 142 
In 1978, the Commission initiated an investigation to determine if 
the procedures for obtaining a cross-ownership waiver could be stream-
lined.143 As a result of this investigation, the Commission facilitated the 
procedure for obtaining waivers by creating a rebuttable presumption 
that CATV service could not exist except through common ownership 
where it was demonstrated that the waiver was consistent with the public 
interest and that the proposed service area contained fewer than thirty 
homes per route mile of coaxial cable. 144 In a subsequent proceeding, the 
FCC further extended the exceptions to the cross-ownership rules by 
adopting an exemption for rural areas. 145 Under this exclusion, tele-
phone companies are exempt from the cross-ownership rules where the 
proposed service contains fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. 146 
D. Relaxing the Cross-Ownership Rules 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act147 
("Cable Policy Act") to clarify and define the respective responsibilities 
of federal and state governments over the regulation of cable television. 
Section 533 of the Cable Act, entitled "Ownership Restrictions," effec-
tively incorporated the FCC's cross-ownership rules into the statutory 
framework. 148 By enacting this section, Congress implicitly recognized 
142. /d.; see also In re Revision of the Processing Policies for Waivers of the Telephone 
Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 69 F.C.C.2d 1097, 1110 (1978) 
(clarification of what constitutes "good cause" under section 64.56(a)); In re Appli-
cations of Telephone Companies For Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities 
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 
750 (1970). 
143. See In re Clarification and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 69 F.C.C.2d 1097 
(1978). 
144. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(b) (1988); In re Revision of the Processing Policies for Waiv-
ers of the Telephone Company-Cable Television "Cross Ownership Rules," Sections 
63.54 and 64.601 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 82 F.C.C.2d 233, 
242-44 (1979). Telephone companies must also submit affidavits verifying the asser-
tions made in the waiver requests. 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(b)(4) (1988). The presump-
tion provided in section 63.56(b) may be rebutted by a showing that more than 
thirty homes are contained in the service area or that the opposing party has a 
present intention to offer non-affiliated cable service. /d. § 63.56(d)(l),(2). 
145. In re Elimination of the Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership 
Rules, Sections 63.54-63.56 for Rural Areas, 88 F.C.C.2d 564 (1981); see also No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Elimination of the Telephone Company-Cable 
Television Cross-Ownership Rules for Rural Areas, 84 F.C.C.2d 335 (1981). 
146. 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1988). When first enacted, the rural exception did not apply 
where a competing cable television system was under construction or already in 
existence. Elimination of the Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership 
Rules, 88 F.C.C.2d at 576. This restriction, however, was eliminated by the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, at 56, 
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4693-94. 
147. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779. 
148. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1986) with 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a)-(b) 
(1988). The Cable Policy Act also directed the FCC to adopt implementing regula-
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the continued need for prohibiting affiliation between telephone compa-
nies and CATV systems. 149 Less than five years later, however, the FCC 
found it necessary to re-examine the cross-ownership rules to determine 
whether the original justifications for these rules were still valid. 150 
The Commission addressed the continued viability of the cross-own-
ership rules by examining the rules in light of the current market place 
conditions confronting the CATV industry. 151 From its investigation, 
the Commission found that because approximately eighty percent of the 
nation was CATV ready, much of the anticompetitive potential which 
originally prompted the need for the cross-ownership rules was no longer 
present. 152 For example, telephone companies could no longer obtain the 
economic and competitive advantage of being the first CATV provider in 
the area. 153 Similarly, the emergence of several large CATV networks 
lessened the need to protect the CATV industry from potential competi-
tors.154 Accordingly, the Commission tentatively concluded that a flat 
ban on television-cable affiliation was no longer necessary to protect the 
mature CATV industry.Iss 
IV. MANDATORY ACCESS TO POLE ATTACHMENTS 
A. The Need for Pole Access Regulation 
In the same breath in which it tentatively concluded to relax the 
cross-ownership rules, the Commission acknowledged that the CATV in-
tions for section 533. The FCC responded by adopting regulations which were es-
sentially the same as the cross-ownership rules. See Amendments of Parts 1, 63 and 
76 of the Commission's Rules to Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (1985). But see supra note 146. 
149. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
at 4693 ("[T]he intent of section [533(b) was] to codify current FCC rules concern-
ing the provision of video programming over cable systems by common 
carriers. . . . "). 
150. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 
63.54-63.58, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 5092 (1987) (notice of inquiry). 
151. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 
63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5881-54 (1988). 
152. Id. at 5853; see also supra note 10. 
153. Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5853. This reasoning, however, may not be 
true with respect to new broadband services (i.e., data distribution, facsimile trans-
mission) which is just developing. Because telephone companies have existing plant 
and facilities which could be adapted in a relatively short time to provide these 
services, they have the ability to enter the broadband services market very rapidly. 
Consequently, they would secure the market efficiencies that come with being the 
first provider in an area. 
154. I d. The Commission found that the lack of competition in the CATV industry had 
stifled the development of additional broadband services. By permitting telephone 
companies to compete in the CATV business, a greater variety of choices for con-
sumers would result. Id. at 5857-58. 
155. Id. at 5853. Significantly, the Commission did not contemplate disposing of the 
cross-ownership rules altogether. Rather, it simply proposed to relax the standards 
with respect to what constituted "ownership" or "control" for purposes of the rules. 
See id. at 5868-69 (Appendix II). 
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dustry's growth had not completely eliminated the potential for preda-
tory practices by telephone companies. Consequently, the Commission 
indicated that it might implement rules which would require telephone 
companies to provide equal access to pole space as a prerequisite for en-
tering the CATV business. 156 Indeed, new regulations which mandate 
access to pole attachments may very well be necessary. 157 Before adopt-
ing such rules, however, the present regulatory framework that governs 
cable television should be examined to determine if existing rules could 
provide the needed protection. 
Under the current regulatory scheme that governs cable television, 
two distinct regulations may ensure that CATV operators will have ac-
cess to pole attachments. The first regulation is section 224(b) of the 
Pole Attachment Act which gives the Commission the authority to en-
sure that the rates charged for pole attachments are just and reason-
able.158 Section 224(b)(l) can be utilized to compel access in a limited 
number of situations. For example, if a utility pole owner discontinues 
providing communication space solely to avoid FCC jurisdiction, the 
FCC could claim jurisdiction based on an unreasonable practice. 159 Sim-
ilarly, termination of a pole attachment agreement in retaliation for a 
CATV operator's complaint to the Commission can be set aside as an 
unreasonable practice. 160 
Section 224(b)(l), however, does not directly require utilities Y> pro-
vide space for pole attachments. 161 This section also does not prohibit a 
telephone company from terminating a pole attachment agreement, or 
allowing an agreement to expire, where the telephone company can 
demonstrate a reasonable explanation for the action. 162 If telephone 
companies are permitted to compete in the CATV business, a higher 
rental offer for pole space by an affiliated CATV system may constitute a 
reason for refusing to renew an independent CATV operator's pole at-
tachment agreement. Consequently, section 224(b) of the Pole Attach-
ment Act does not satisfactorily ensure access to pole attachments for 
independent CATV operators. 
The second regulation which may guarantee access to pole space is 
section 541(a)(2) of the Cable Policy Act. 163 This section provides: 
156. /d. at 5859-60. 
157. See infra notes 184-193 and accompanying text. 
158. 47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982). 
159. See Cable Information Serv., Inc. v. Appalachian Power Co., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 391 
n.8 (1980); S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 124. The FCC, however, will not grant relief upon an alleged unreasona-
ble denial of pole attachment access where a CATV operator does not hold a valid 
cable television franchise. Paragon Cable Tel., Inc. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 152, 153-54 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
160. See Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5871 n.16. 
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. 
163. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2786 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) 
(Supp. IV 1986)). 
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Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction 
of a cable system over public rights-of-way, and through ease-
ments, which is within the area to be served by the cable system 
and which have been dedicated for compatible uses .... 164 
189 
Section 541(a)(2) appears to grant a franchised CATV operator a right of 
access to utility poles that occupy a public right-of-way. 165 Similarly, the 
section arguably grants a right of access to any pole that occupies an 
easement, whether public or private, as long as the easement is dedicated 
for compatible use. This latter conclusion is supported by statutory pro-
visions following section 541(a)(2) that require the CATV operator to 
compensate the owner of the property for use of the easement. 166 The 
legislative history of the Cable Policy Act indicates that these provisions 
may have been included to avoid the taking proscriptions of the Fifth 
Amendment. 167 Section 633 of the House version of the Cable Policy 
Act, which required landlords to provide access to their property for 
CATV attachment, contained language substantially similar to the lan-
guage used in section 541(a)(2)(A)-(C). 168 In analyzing this section, the 
drafters of the Cable Policy Act acknowledged that the section was 
designed to avoid the unconstitutional taking problem in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 169 Loretto involved a statute which 
required New York landlords to permit CATV hookups to their prop-
erty.170 The Supreme Court found that this statute authorized a taking 
of property for which just compensation was due. 171 
164. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). 
165. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, at 59, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 4969; see also Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund 
VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (Congress intended section 541(a)(2) to 
create a right of access). 
166. These provisions provide that in using the easements, the CATV operator shall 
ensure: 
(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the property and the 
convenience and safety of other persons not be adversely affected by the 
installation or construction of facilities necessary for a cable system; 
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or removal of 
such facilities be borne by the cable operator or subscriber, or a combina-
tion of both; and 
(C) that the owner of the property be justly compensated by the cable 
operator for any damages caused by the installation, construction, opera-
tion, or removal of such facilities by the cable operator. 
47 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. IV 1986). 
167. The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: 
Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
168. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984). 
169. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, at 79-81, 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4716-18. 
170. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421-25; see also supra text accompanying note 64. 
171. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425-41; see also supra text accompanying notes 63-65. 
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Section 633, however, was deleted from the enacted version of the 
Cable Act. 172 Although the significance of the deletion of section 633 is 
debatable, it can be argued that the provisions of section 633 were trans-
ferred and preserved in section 541(a)(2). Thus, by requiring compensa-
tion to be paid to the owners of the easements, it can be inferred that the 
drafters of section 541(a)(2) contemplated that this section would man-
date access and, therefore, would authorize a taking. Under such a view, 
"easement" as used in section 541(a)(2) includes both public and private 
easements. 173 Furthermore, in light of the Cable Policy Act's express 
purpose of encouraging the growth and development of CATV sys-
tems, 174 it is reasonable to conclude that section 541 (a)(2) is intended to 
grant a right of access to pole space on poles that occupy public rights-of-
way as well as private easements that are dedicated to compatible uses. 
The FCC, however, maintains that section 541(a)(2) does not guar-
antee access to pole space in all cases; rather, this section simply permits 
CATV operators to use the same rights-of-way and easements that tele-
phone companies utilize. 175 Indeed, nowhere in section 54l(a)(2) is there 
explicit language which requires telephone companies to give over a por-
tion of their pole or conduit space to CATV systems. 176 Moreover, the 
subsections that require just compensation can be narrowly construed as 
requiring compensation only in the event that a CATV operator damages 
the telephone companies' property when installing its own poles or con-
duits, rather than as requiring compensation for a taking. 177 The dele-
tion of section 633 from the enacted version of the Cable Policy Act 
arguably supports a narrow construction of the compensation provisions 
of section 541(a)(2). Although section 633 contained compensation Ian-
172. Cf 47 U.S.C. § 541(e) (Supp. IV 1986). 
173. See Centel Cable TV v. Admiral's Cove ~soc., 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(CATV system had implied right of action under section 54l(a)(2) to enforce a 
claimed right to provide CATV service to residential community); Cable TV Fund 
14-A, Ltd. v. Property Owners Ass'n Chesapeake Ranch Estates, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 
422 (D. Md. 1989). See generally Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enterprises, 633 
F. Supp. 1315 (D. Del. 1986); Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 
1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543, 610-12 (1985). 
174. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. IV 1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, 
at 59, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4969 ("[A)ny private arrange-
ment which seeks to restrict a cable system's use of such easements or rights of way 
which have been granted to other utilities are in violation of [section 54l(a)(2)] and 
not enforceable."). 
175. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 
63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5854, 5871 n.17 (1988). 
176. See supra text accompanying note 164. 
177. See supra note 166. A narrow construction of the compensation requirements in 
section 541(a)(2) is logical in light of the applicability of the Pole Attachment Act. 
Once the CATV operators receive pole space, the compensation for access is gov-
erned by the rate formula provisions of the Pole Attachment Act. See supra notes 
47-57 and accompanying text. Thus, if the compensation requirements of section 
54l(a)(2) are construed as requiring compensation for access to telephone company 
poles rather than damages incurred by CATV operators utilizing the public ease-
ments, the rate provisions of the Pole Attachment Act would be superfluous. 
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guage similar to that contained in section 541(a)(2)(A)-(C), its language 
was much broader. 178 Section 633 included a provision which would 
have required the FCC or a state agency to create regulations for ensur-
ing that just compensation was provided for use of the landlord's prop-
erty. In contrast, section 541(a)(2) provides that just compensation is to 
be ensured by the cable operator and is required only in the event of 
damages. 179 Because it is questionable whether section 541(a)(2) satisfies 
the just compensation requirements of the Constitution, it can be argued 
that had Congress intended for section 541(a)(2) to authorize a taking it 
would have included the broader compensation language of section 
633.180 
Section 541(a)(2) can also be construed as compelling access only 
where the utility poles are occupying public rights-of-way or public ease-
ments.181 It can be inferred that by deleting section 633 from the Cable 
Policy Act, Congress implicitly rejected the creation of a right of access 
to private property. Therefore, section 541(a)(2)'s use of the word ease-
ment means a public, rather than a private, easement. 182 Under such an 
interpretation, telephone companies could not be required to provide 
pole access to a competing CATV operator unless every pole in a particu-
lar service area occupied a public right-of-way or a public easement. Ac-
cordingly, telephone companies would be able to deny access where their 
poles were located on private property, regardless of whether the ease-
ment was dedicated to a compatible use. 
Ifthe FCC is correct in construing section 541 so as to deny a gen-
eral right of access to pole space, the present regulatory framework 
which governs CATV is clearly insufficient to prevent telephone compa-
nies from manipulating their control over access to utility poles. But 
even if the FCC is incorrect and section 541 does guarantee a right of 
access to pole space, the potential for predatory pole access practices will 
still exist. Because section 541 cfoes not guarantee that telephone compa-
nies will provide equal access to pole space, these companies would be 
able to manipulate pole access to their affiliates' advantage. For example, 
if a telephone company gives the last remaining space on its poles to an 
affiliated CATV system, their easement would no longer be dedicated for 
compatible use and section 541 would not be applicable. 183 Thus, irre-
178. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984). 
179. See supra note 166. 
180. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 157-58 (3rd Cir. 1989). But 
see Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. 
Supp. 871, 874 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
181. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 
63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5871 n.17 (1988). 
182. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Cable Policy 
Act does not give CATV systems a right of access to multi-unit dwellings for pur-
pose of providing cable service to tenants). But see supra notes 166-174 and accom-
panying text. See generally Meyerson, supra note 173, at 610-12. 
183. Accord Meyerson, supra note 173, at 611-12. 
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spective of whether section 541 guarantees pole access over public or pri-
vate easements, new equal access regulations should be implemented to 
ensure a competitive environment if telephone companies are permitted 
to enter the CATV business. 
B. Implementing the Mandatory Pole Access Rules 
To ensure that the new pole access rules will be effective in eliminat-
ing pole access discrimination, several factors should be considered in 
defining the scope of these rules. First, the rules should be designed to 
prevent favoritism to affiliated CATV systems and inhibit monopoliza-
tion of new broadband services. 184 A rule which requires telephone com-
panies to certify that they presently offer equal pole access for cable 
related hook-ups to both independent and affiliated CATV systems 
would accomplish these designs. This certification procedure should be a 
prerequisite for receiving permission to participate in the CATV 
business. 
Second, the rules should eliminate any potential for the telephone 
companies to terminate existing pole attachments on the basis of a higher 
rate offer by an affiliated CATV system. 185 Such a goal could be 
achieved by obligating telephone companies to offer pole access at identi-
cal rates and terms to both affiliated and independent CATV systems. 186 
The rules should also discourage any pole access advantages that 
telephone companies possess over poles which are owned by other utili-
ties. Telephone companies may possess such advantages because they 
have pre-existing lease arrangements with power companies for use of the 
power companies' poles. If the telephone companies were to use the 
leases to secure access on the power companies' poles, independent 
CATV operators would be at a distinct competitive disadvantage. By 
prohibiting affiliated CATV systems from utilizing telephone company 
access rights to poles owned by other utilities, such advantages would 
effectively be discouraged.1s1 
184. Because of the relative infancy of the market for broadband services, a rule requir-
ing equal access to pole space for independent CATV operators would prevent tele-
phone companies from rapidly entering and monopolizing this market. See supra 
note 153. 
185. Because the Pole Attachment Act does not mandate access, the FCC arguably will 
possess jurisdiction over a termination of pole access only when the termination 
constituted an unreasonable practice. See supra text accompanying notes 158-60. If 
the termination is based on higher rate offer by another CATV system, however, the 
termination may be viewed as a reasonable practice. See supra text accompanying 
notes 161-162. 
186. This rule would also minimize the ability of the telephone companies to employ 
such alleged anticompetitive practices as overcharging for make ready work, requir-
ing large prepayments, and delaying work completion. See Cross-Ownership Rules, 
3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5852-53. 
187. The FCC has indicated that it may prohibit telephone companies from providing 
CATV service when equal access to power utility poles is not available. See Cross-
Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5860. This solution, however, is unnecessarily 
restrictive. Although the rule would effectively curb the telephone companies' abil-
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Finally, from the Supreme Court's holdings in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter188 and Florida Power Co. v. F.C.C., 189 it is·apparent that rules 
which require a property owner to dedicate a portion of their property 
for CATV attachments constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment 
for which just compensation is required. 190 Because the new access rules 
would require telephone companies to provide pole space for independ-
ent CATV hook-ups, they could arguably run afoul of the takings pro-
scriptions.191 Consequently, the equal access rules should include 
provisions which require that just compensation be paid for any access 
that telephone companies are required to provide. The just compensa-
tion provisions could be developed from the rate determination formula 
of the Pole Attachment Act192 as well as the compensation considera-
tions contained in section 633 of the House version of the Cable Policy 
Act.I93 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the past two decades, effective regulation of cable television has 
produced an environment in which this new communications medium 
has flourished. But with the goal of nation-wide dissemination of cable 
television rapidly reaching fruition, much of the anticompetitive behavior 
which once threatened the viability of an infant CATV industry is no 
longer present. Accordingly, the FCC has tentatively concluded to relax 
ity to utilize their relationships with power companies for the benefit of their affili· 
ates, it would discourage the very same competition that the FCC seeks to 
encourage by relaxing the cross-ownership rules. See supra notes 151-155 and ac-
companying text. Conversely, a rule which prohibits an affiliated CATV system 
from utilizing a telephone company's access rights to poles owned by a power com-
pany would eliminate the potential for anticompetitive behavior while preserving 
competition in the CATV market. Both affiliated and independent CATV systems 
should compete on an equal basis for power company pole space. 
188. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also supra notes 63-64, 169-171 and accompanying text. 
189. 480 U.S. 245 (1987); see also supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra note 167. 
191. Several theories can be advanced for finding that the equal access rules do not con· 
stitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. It can be argued that because tele-
phone companies have monopolistic control over access to essential resources, 
antitrust principles require the telephone companies to make the resources available 
to others on equal terms. See General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 860-
61 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 
(1963); United States v. Terminal Ry. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912). Similarly, it can 
be argued that the equal access rules do not amount to a taking because they are 
simply a reasonable precondition to entry into the CATV business. Cf General Tel. 
Co., 449 F.2d at 860. Because it is uncertain whether either of these theories would 
be adopted by a court, just compensation provisions should be included to ensure 
the constitutional validity of the equal access rules. 
192. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. 
193. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984); see also supra notes 167-173, 178-180 and ac-
companying text. 
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the telephone company-cable television cross-ownership rules-rules 
which once partially sheltered the CATV industry from competition. 
Indeed, increased competition in the CATV market is likely to en-
courage the exploration of new communication services as well as in-
crease the responsiveness of CATV providers to the needs of the 
marketplace. Increased competition from telephone companies, how-
ever, raises anew the fear that these companies will utilize their monopo-
listic control over the means of access for cable distribution to favor an 
affiliated CATV system. The regulatory framework which presently gov-
erns cable television access to pole space is not sufficient to protect in-
dependent CATV systems from predatory pole access practices. 
Therefore, to balance the benefits of injecting competitive efficiencies into 
the CATV market against the increased potential for anticoi:npetitive 
pole access behavior, rules should be implemented that require telephone 
companies to provide equal access to pole space to independent CATV 
systems as a precondition for entry into the CATV market. 
John P. Morrissey 
